Ricky D. Krambule v. Barbara R. Krambule : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Ricky D. Krambule v. Barbara R. Krambule : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert A. Echard; Robert Echard & Associates; Attorney for Appellee.
Robert L. Neeley; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Krambule v. Krambule, No. 981567 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1798







IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS .A10 0^,^-7 -7 
X)CKET NO.. T i J ^ Z . 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant# 
vs. ) Case No. 981567-CA 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, ) Civil No. 910750473 
Defendant/Appellee• ) Priority No. 15 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND MODIFIED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED BY THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE 
DARWIN C. HANSEN, PRESIDING 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Robert A. Echard 
Robert Echard & Associates 
Attorney for Appellee 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 393-2300 
Robert L. Neeley (2373) 
Attorney for Appellant 
2485 Grant Ave., #200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3646 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAR 2 9 1999 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs, ) Case No. 981567-CA 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, ) Civil No. 910750473 
Defendant/Appellee, ) Priority No. 15 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND MODIFIED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED BY THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE 
DARWIN C. HANSEN, PRESIDING 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Robert A. Echard 
Robert Echard & Associates 
Attorney for Appellee 
Key Bank Building, Suite 2 00 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 393-2300 
Robert L. Neeley (2373) 
Attorney for Appellant 
2485 Grant Ave., #200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3646 
TART.E OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ± 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i i 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 15 
I. THERE EXISTS GENUINE DISPUTES OVER 
MATERIAL FACTS JUSTIFYING DENIAL OF 
BARBARA KRAMBULE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THAT RICK KRAMBULE BE ADJUDICATED 
THE LEGAL FATHER OF MATHEW KRAMBULE 15 
II. RICK KRAMBULE WAS ENTITLED TO BE NOTIFIED 
THAT BARBARA KRAMBULE CONTINUED WITH ARTI-
FICIAL INSEMINATION PROCEDURES TO CONCEIVE 
A CHILD AFTER THE PARTIES' SEPARATION IN-
TENDING TO HOLD HIM AS THE LEGAL FATHER 19 
III. BARBARA KRAMBULE SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM 
ALLEGING RICK KRAMBULE BE ADJUDICATED THE 
FATHER PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL 
AND RES JUDICATA 22 
IV. BARBARA KRAMBULE WAIVED ANY CONTRACTUAL 
RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THE ARTIFICIAL IN-
SEMINATION CONTRACT 25 
CONCLUSION 28 
ADDENDUM 3 0 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Allen vs. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d 798, 
810 (Utah 1992) 17 
Andalex Resources, Inc. vs. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 
(Utah app. 1994) 2 
Atlas Corp. Vs. Clovis Nat'1 Bank, 838 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987) 18 
B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. vs. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99, 
101 (Utah App. 1988) 26, 27 
Barber vs. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 715 P.2d 24 8 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 2 
Celltex Corp. Vs. Catrett, 477 U.S., 317, 314 (1986) . . . 3 
Copper State Thrift & Loan vs. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 
(Utah App. 1987) 24 
Debry vs. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444-445 (Utah 1995) . . . . 24 
Debry vs. Occidental/Nebraska, Fed. Sav., 754 P.2d 60, 
62 (Utah 1988) 17 
Estate of Covington vs. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 
(Utah App. 1994) 24 
Faulkner vs. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983 . 18 
Hipwell vs. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 
(Utah 1997) 3 
Interwest Construction vs. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah 
App. 1994) 25 
In Re: Marriage of Witback-Wildhagen, 667 N.E. 2d 122 
(111. App. 4 Dist. 1996) 21 
ii 
Lopez vs. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 601, 602 (Utah 
1997) 3 
Madsen vs. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988) . . . . 24 
Masters vs. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989). . 22 
Record vs. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah App. 1994). . . 18 
Ringwood vs. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 
(Utah App. 1990) 24 
Robinson vs. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 264 
(Utah App. 1987) 2-3 
State in Interest of J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). . . 15 
State vs. Irizarry, 893 P.2d 1107, 1109-1110 (Utah App. 
1995) 23 
Weise vs. Weise, 699 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1985) 22 
Western Fam. Credit Bank vs. Pratt, 860 P.2d 3 76, 3 77 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) 2 
Winegar vs. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2 104 (Utah 1991) . . . . 2 
iii 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §30-1-17.2(2) 15 
Utah Code Annotated §78-25-18 15 
SECONDARY AUTHORITY 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant# 
vs. 




) Case No. 981567-CA 
) Civil No. 910750473 
) Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE: Are there existing genuine disputes over material 
facts justifying denial of Barbara R. Krambule1s Motion for 
Summary Judgment that Ricky D. Krambule be adjudged the "legal 
father" of Mathew Krambule. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On review of a summary judgment the 
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party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to 
have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly 
arising therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him. 
Winegar vs. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law 
rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the 
trial court's legal conclusion. Barber vs. Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange. 715 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The trial court granted Barbara Krambule's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on March 27, 1998. 
ISSUE; Was Rick D. Krambule entitled to be notified by 
Barbara R. Krambule after the parties separation she was 
continuing with artificial insemination procedures to conceive a 
child for which she intended to hold him as the "legal father"? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary Judgment is appropriate only 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. 
P.56; Western Fam. Credit Bank vs. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 
App. 1993), cert, denied, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994). 
In addition, when granting a Motion for Summary Judgment, a 
trial judge must consider each element of the claim under the 
appropriate standard of proof. Andalex Resources, Inc. vs. 
Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994). Accordingly, in 
evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, the court 
must take into consideration the eventual standard of proof for 
each element at trial on the merits. Robinson vs. Intermountain 
-2-
Health Care. 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). 
The trial court granted Barbara Krambule's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on March 27, 19 98. 
ISSUE: Does there exist a genuine dispute over material 
facts precluding Barbara Krambule from asserting Ricky Krambule 
is the father of Mathew Krambule pursuant to Doctrines of 
Estoppel and Res Judicata. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The nonmoving party, in order to defeat 
summary judgment, need only make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial. Celltex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S., 317, 324 (1986). 
The trial court granted Barbara Krambule•s Motion for 
Summary Judgment on March 27, 19 98. 
ISSUE: Did Barbara Krambule waive contractual rights under 
the Agreement to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through 
Artificial Insemination by failing to assert her rights until 
four (4) years had passed? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The records and facts must be reviewed 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 
Hipwell v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997). 
The trial court must construe not only facts but all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Lopez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 601, 602 
(Utah 1997). 
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Summary Judgment is only appropriate when there are no 
genuine issues of material facts and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) . 
The trial court granted Barbara Krambule's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on March 27, 1998. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Appellant, Ricky D. Krambule, does not believe there 
are any existing constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of 
this appeal except interpretation of Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is made from an. order of the Second Judicial 
District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Darwin C. Hansen, granting Barbara Krambule's Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce. Barbara Krambule filed a Petition seeking a 
court order declaring her minor child, Mathew Krambule, to be the 
natural child of Ricky Krambule. Further, she sought an order 
requiring Ricky Krambule to assume and pay all medical bills of 
her pregnancy, for past due child support, day care for the 
child, and for a court order setting the amount for ongoing child 
support. 
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The trial court granted Barbara Krambule's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment ruling Rick Krambule to be the legal 
father of Mathew Krambule, and therefore had the legal duties of 
a biological father. The trial court signed an order granting 
Barbara Krambule's Motion for Summary Judgment on March 27, 1998. 
The trial court reserved for further hearing the issues of child 
support, past due child support, day care, medical expenses, and 
attorney fees. The court entered an order on July 9, 1998 
entitled Modified Decree of Divorce wherein the Court ruled on 
the issues of ongoing child support, past due child support, 
medical expenses, day care for the minor child, Mathew Krambule, 
together with an award of attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner, Ricky D. Krambule, signed a Complaint for 
divorce on July 29, 1991 and the same was filed in August, 1991. 
(Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce) At the time Petitioner 
filed, one child had been born of issue of the marriage, to-wit: 
Stephanie Krambule, date of birth January 29, 1985. (Petitioner's 
Complaint) Stephanie was conceived by means of artificial 
insemination. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, page 4-5) 
Rick and Barbara Krambule separated on May 3, 1998 when Rick 
Krambule moved out of the parties' home. (Barbara Krambule's 
Deposition at page 11) After the parties' separated on May 3, 
1991, Barbara Krambule continued to undergo artificial insemina-
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tion procedures at the University of Utah in May, 1991 and June, 
1991. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 17-18). Barbara 
Krambule conceived on June 23, 1991 by means of artificial 
insemination with a sperm donor. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, 
pg. 18). Rick Krambule is unable to have children as he is 
sterile. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 5). Mathew 
Krambule was born on March 24, 1992. (Barbara Krambule's 
Deposition, pg. 30). 
Barbara Krambule did not advise Rick Krambule that she was 
continuing with the artificial insemination procedures after the 
parties' separation on May 3, 1991. (Barbara Krambule's 
Deposition, pg. 18-19) . Barbara Krambule advised Rick Krambule 
she had conceived and was pregnant with Mathew in September, 
maybe August, 1991. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 21). 
After Rick Krambule moved out on May 3, 1991, Barbara Krambule 
wrote out all the checks to pay the University medical bills. 
(Deposition of Barbara Krambule, pg. 47). 
Barbara Krambule retained an attorney and filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim in September, 1991. The Counterclaim did not 
make any reference to Barbara Krambule expecting a child. 
(Answer and Counterclaim). 
On December 3, 1991, Barbara Krambule's attorney wrote that 
Barbara Krambule was expecting a child; that she was somewhere 
between four and six months pregnant. (Deposition Exhibit 2, 
Barbara Krambule's Deposition). The letter indicated Barbara 
Krambule had debated at great lengths whether she should or 
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should not pursue having the Court order Rick Krambule to be the 
father and pursue child support for her expected child. (Barbara 
Krambule's Deposition Exhibit 2). The letter indicated Barbara 
Krambule was not going to sign the Stipulation and Property 
Settlement as it did not provide for acknowledgment and support 
of her expected child. (Exhibit 2, Barbara Krambule's 
Deposition). 
However, on January 16, 1992, Barbara Krambule and her then 
attorney executed the Stipulation which did not provide for the 
expected child and returned the same to Rick Krambule's attorney. 
On February 10, 1992, Rick Krambule appeared before District 
Court Judge, Michael D. Allphin, to obtain a Decree of Divorce. 
Rick Krambule was sworn and testified and indicated since the 
parties' separation, Barbara Krambule had become pregnant by 
means of artificial insemination and that he was not the father 
of that child and she acknowledged that to be true. (Minute 
Entry to Decree of Divorce and Affidavit of Linda Stewart). On 
April 3, 1992, the Decree of Divorce was granted and entered by 
the Clerk of the Court. (Decree of Divorce). Mathew Krambule 
was born on March 24, 1992; approximately ten (10) days prior to 
the divorce becoming final. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 
30) . 
Consistent with the parties' Decree of Divorce, Rick 
Krambule paid Barbara Krambule $274.00 per month alimony for a 
period not to exceed four (4) years from June 1, 1991. (Decree 
of Divorce). Rick Krambule also paid for books and tuition for 
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Barbara Krambule to attend Weber State University; likewise for a 
period not to exceed four (4) years from June 1, 1991. (Decree 
of Divorce). Barbara Krambule acknowledged Rick Krambule paid 
the alimony and for her college tuition and books. (Barbara 
Krambule's Deposition, pg. 28). Rick Krambule has never exercised 
visitation with Mathew; although he sees Stephanie on a regular 
basis. (Deposition of Barbara Krambule, pg. 29). Stephanie lived 
with Rick Krambule for the school year 1997-1998. (Rick 
Krambule's Petition for Modification of Decree). 
On July 15, 1996, Barbara Krambule filed a Petition in the 
above-entitled case seeking to adjudicate the parentage of Mathew 
Krambule requesting the Court determine Rick Krambule to be the 
natural father and obliged to pay child support, day care, 
medical expenses. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 29). 
At the request of the Court, both parties filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment. On January 21, 1998, both Motions for Summary 
Judgment were argued before District Court Judge, Darwin C. 
Hansen. Judge Hansen indicated he was going to treat both 
motions as Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. (1/21/98 TR. at 
61). The trial court found while there are issues of fact in the 
pleadings of the parties, the Court does not find that those 
issues are material with reference to the ruling on the legal 
obligation of whether Krambule is the legal father. (1/21/98 TR. 
at 61). 
The trial court found it is clear that Rick Krambule is not 
the biological father of Mathew Krambule. (1/21/98 TR. at 61). 
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The trial court indicated the Court must look at the facts 
surrounding how this conception occurred and make a judgment 
whether or not a legal obligation exists on the part of both 
parties in reference to any child born as a result of artificial 
insemination medical treatment. (1/21/98 TR. at 61-62). The 
Court found the parties entered into a contract on or about July 
18, 1990 in an effort to have a child. (1/21/98 TR. at 62). The 
contract gave rise to a legal obligation on the part of both 
parties to be legally responsible for any child that is born as a 
result of that treatment. (1/21/98 TR. at 62) . 
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that for the 
contract to become null and void and not applicable to the 
parties, an event must occur. (1/21/98 TR. at 62). A divorce 
which is a legal direct declaration by the Court that a husband 
and wife are no longer husband and wife, would automatically 
terminate the contract. (1/21/98 TR. at 62-63). In this 
particular case, the child was conceived during the marriage, and 
indeed, born before the Decree of Divorce was signed. (1/21/98 
TR. at 63). For those reasons, the trial court found that Rick 
Krambule was the legal father of Mathew. (1/21/98 TR. at 63). 
The Court ruled public policy is clear before we take away the 
rights of a child there has to be a very compelling reason. 
(1/21/98 TR. at 64). In the context of this case, the only way 
the Court would be persuaded that Rick Krambule in this case does 
not have a legal obligation to Mathew is if in fact a divorce had 
occurred prior to conception. (1/21/98 TR. at 65). 
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The deposition of Barbara Krambule was ordered published and 
made part of the Court file by the trial court. (1/21/98 TR. at 
68-69). 
On April 30, 1998, trial was held before District Court 
Judge, Darwin C. Hansen, on the issues of child support, day 
care, arrearages for child support and day care, and medical 
expenses, together with attorney fees. Barbara Krambule 
acknowledged she did not ask Rick Krambule to pay for any medical 
expenses for Mathew after April, 1991. (4/30/98 TR. at 77). 
Barbara Krambule testified she changed her position in regard to 
making Mathew an issue at the time of the initial divorce in 1991 
as she just wanted to sign the divorce papers and try and get her 
life back together. (4/30/98 TR. at 96-97). She thought the 
best thing for all of us for now is just to get divorced and work 
on it in the future. (4/30/98 TR. at 97). When she got stronger 
and healthier she could go back and readdress this issue. 
(4/30/98 TR. at 97). Barbara Krambule acknowledged she did not 
tell Rick Krambule she was going to readdress the issue of Mathew 
when she got stronger. (4/30/98 TR. at 97) . 
Rick Krambule testified that in October, 1991, Barbara 
Krambule told him all she wanted from him in terms of Mathew was 
the use of the Krambule name, she expected no child support and 
expected no relationship. (4/30/98 TR. at 152-153) . Karen 
Krambule Hiller, Rick Krambule's sister, testified in a telephone 
conversation in September, 1991, Barbara Krambule stated she did 
not want Rick Krambule to have anything to do with the child at 
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all and the only thing she wanted was the child to have the same 
last name as she had. (4/30/98 TR. at 197-199) . 
In Findings of Fact 9a. to the Modified Decree of Divorce, 
the Court made a Finding during late October, 1991 after 
Respondent's pregnancy with Mathew became known, Respondent told 
Petitioner that she only wanted the Krambule name for Mathew and 
nothing more from him. In Findings of Fact 9b., the Court found 
Barbara Krambule essentially made the same statement to 
Petitioner's sister. In Findings of Fact 9e., the Court made a 
finding that Barbara Krambule filed her Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce and for paternity as to Mathew on July 15, 1996, four 
years and three months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
In Finding of Fact 10. the Court found in return for 
Respondent's failure to act or to make claim against Petitioner 
for legal benefits concerning Mathew, Rick Krambule agreed to pay 
Respondent alimony, provide for Barbara Krambule's education at 
Weber State University in Ogden, Utah and proceeded to his life 
without consideration as to any financial obligation for Mathew, 
for purposes of establishing Rick Krambule's estoppel argument. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There exists genuine disputes of material facts justifying 
denial of Barbara Krambule's Motion for Summary Judgment that 
Rick Krambule be adjudicated the legal father of Mathew Krambule. 
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The trial court found that Rick Krambule was not the biological 
father of Mathew Krambule. Thus no legal presumption exists that 
Rick Krambule is the father of Mathew Krambule born to his wife, 
Barbara, during their marriage. Rick Krambule has not visited 
nor maintained any relationship whatsoever with Mathew Krambule 
in reliance on Barbara Krambule's statement to him that she 
wanted nothing from him but the Krambule name. 
The only manner in which Rick Krambule can be found to be 
the legal father of Mathew Krambule is pursuant to the contract 
of July 18, 1990 entitled Consent to Perform Procedures to 
Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination of Donor/Sperm. 
The trial court ruled this contract could only be reputed by 
divorce which occurred prior to the conception of Mathew on June 
23, 1992. 
The contract should be construed to give effect to the 
intent of the parties. The intent of the parties is gleaned from 
the totality of the circumstances. Paragraph 8 of the contract 
indicates that participation in the artificial insemination 
procedure(s) is voluntary. The issue is not whether the contract 
was voluntarily signed initially but whether Rick Krambule's 
participation in the artificial procedure(s) was voluntary. 
Participation speaks in terms of future tense. It is a factual 
question for a court of law to determine if Rick Krambule 
voluntarily consented to participation of artificial 
insemination procedure(s) after initially signing. A reasonable 
interpretation of the agreement is that continued participation 
-12-
in the artificial insemination procedures was contingent upon 
voluntary participation of both parties. 
Voluntary is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th 
Edition, as: 
Done by design or intention, purpose, 
intended. Produced in or by an act 
of choice. Resulting from choosing. The 
word, especially in statutes, often implies 
knowledge of essential facts. 
Rick Krambule was entitled to be notified that Barbara 
Krambule was continuing with the artificial insemination 
procedures after the parties separated on May 3, 1991. Barbara 
Krambule testified in her deposition she did not tell Rick 
Krambule she was continuing with participation in the artificial 
insemination program. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 18-
19). Barbara Krambule owed Rick Krambule a duty of good faith 
and fair dealing and should have advised him of her continued 
participation in the artificial insemination program. When one 
party to a contract retains power and sole discretion, it must 
exercise that discretion reasonably and in good faith. If Rick 
Krambule had knowledge of Barbara Krambule's continued 
participation in the program, he could have taken appropriate 
action to protect his legal rights. 
Barbara Krambule should be equitably estopped from alleging 
Rick Krambule is the father of Mathew having waited four (4) 
years and three (3) months after the parties' Decree of Divorce 
before she made a claim to determine that he is the natural 
father of Mathew. Rick Krambule relied on Barbara Krambule's 
-13-
representations that she would not pursue making Mathew Krambule 
an issue. In 1992, Barbara Krambule and her then attorney signed 
a Stipulation which did not acknowledge Rick Krambule was the 
father of Mathew. Findings and a Decree of Divorce was signed 
approved as to form by Barbara Krambule's attorney. In a letter 
dated December 3, 1991, Barbara Krambule stated she was going to 
make the issue of parentage of Mathew an issue. Barbara Krambule 
changed her mind about making an issue of parentage of Mathew at 
the time of the divorce until she felt stronger and healthier. 
She proceeded to make Mathew an issue some four (4) years and 
three (3) months later. 
The claim preclusion branch of res judicata should prohibit 
Barbara Krambule's making a claim to determine the parentage of 
Mathew Krambule as that issue could have and should have been 
litigated in the original Decree of Divorce granted on April 4, 
1992 . 
Barbara Krambule should also be deemed to have waived any 
contractual rights under the artificial insemination contract as 
she intentionally acted in a matter inconsistent with those 
contractual rights causing prejudice to Rick Krambule. 
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ARGUMENT 
THERE EXISTS GENUINE DISPUTES OVER 
MATERIAL FACTS JUSTIFYING DENIAL 
OF BARBARA KRAMBULE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT RICK KRAMBULE 
BE ADJUDICATED THE LEGAL FATHER OF 
MATHEW KRAMBULE 
Mathew Krambule was born March 24, 1992 before the p a r t i e s 
d ivorce was f i n a l . Utah Code Annotated, §30-1-17.2(2) s t a t e s as 
fo l lows , 
children born to the parties after the 
date of the marriage shall be deemed the 
legitimate children of both parties for 
all purposes. 
This statute is often cited for the presumption that 
children born during the course of a marriage are presumed to be 
the children of the husband and wife. It is commonly called 
"Lord Mansfield Rule". State in Interest of J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 
(Utah 1990). However, Lord Mansfield's rule has been 
substantially eroded by the enactment of §78-25-18, U.C.A. which 
expressly mandates the court's utilize blood tests to assist in 
making a determination of paternity. In this case, the parties 
stipulated that Rick D. Krambule was not the biological father of 
Mathew Krambule. The trial court found in Findings of Fact No. 3 
on Motion for Summary Judgment that Rick D. Krambule is not the 
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biological father of the minor child, Mathew Krambule. Therefore, 
no legal presumption exists that Rick Krambule is the father of 
Mathew Krambule having been determined by the Court not to be his 
biological father. 
The trial court found that on July 18, 1990, the parties 
entered into a contract entitled Consent to Perform Procedures to 
Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination of Donor Sperm. 
(Findings of Fact 5 on Motion for Summary Judgment) The trial 
court found that this contract obligated Rick Krambule and 
Barbara Krambule to assume the legal responsiblity for the child, 
Mathew Krambule. (Findings of Fact 5). Therefore, the court 
found Rick Krambule to be the legal father of Mathew Krambule 
pursuant to the parties' artificial insemination contract. 
(Findings of Fact 9). In essence, this case involves contract 
interpretation as well as typical domestic relations issues. 
In Findings of Fact No. 7. on Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the trial court found that in order for the artificial 
insemination contract to be null and void an event must occur 
which would terminate the contract. The trial court did not rule 
on all of the events that could terminate such a contract, 
however in this case, the trial court ruled that a divorce could 
have terminated the contract. 
In Conclusions of Law No. 2 on Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the trial court ruled the artificial insemination contract was 
not repudiated by the separation of the parties and in this case 
could only be reputed by divorce which occurred prior to the 
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conception of the child. The child was conceived on June 23, 
1992 which was prior to the filing of the Complaint for divorce 
in this case. The court ruled in Conclusions of Law No. 4 on 
Motion for Summary Judgment the artificial insemination contract 
was binding on the parties and imposed on both parties the legal 
responsiblity of natural parents to the child Mathew Krambule. 
The issue regarding the parties intent of the artificial 
insemination contract and its interpretation, becomes an 
important focal point in this case. Contracts should be 
construed to give effect to the intent of the parties. Debry v. 
Occidental/Nebraska. Fed. Sav.. 754 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah 1988). It 
is the duty of every court to ascertain and give effect to the 
intentions of the parties. Such intent is gleaned from the 
totality of the circumstances. See Allen v. Prudential Property 
and Cas. Ins.. 839 P.2d 798, 810 (Utah 1992). 
In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment on 
the basis of the contract standing alone. The trial court did 
not hear any evidence as to the intent of the parties nor whether 
the contract is clear on its face. This is not an appropriate 
case to grant summary judgment as there are genuine disputes over 
material facts. When interpretation of a contract must be 
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it becomes a question 
of fact, and if this extrinsic evidence is disputed, then a 
material fact is also disputed and summary judgment cannot be 
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granted. Record v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah App. 1994). 
If the contract is in writing and the language is not 
ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from 
the words of the agreement. Atlas Corp. V. Clovis Nat'1 Bank, 
838 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). A Court may only consider 
extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract 
language is ambiguous or uncertain. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 
P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). A contractual provision is 
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 199) 
Paragraph eight (8) of the artificial insemination contract 
states "our participation in the artificial insemination 
procedure(s) is voluntary". A reasonable interpretation of 
paragraph (8) is that Rick Krambule could withdraw his consent at 
any time. Rick Krambule must act voluntarily at the time of 
signing and also in the future. 
Paragraph (8) can logically be interpreted to mean all 
future or continued participation must be voluntary. For Rick 
Krambule's consent to be voluntary he should have knowledge of 
Barbara Krambule's continued efforts to achieve pregnancy by 
artificial insemination. Voluntary is defined by Black's Law 
Dictionary as an act of choice, resulting from choosing and often 
implies knowledge of essential facts. 
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I I 
RICK KRAMBULE WAS ENTITLED 
TO BE NOTIFIED THAT BARBARA 
KRAMBULE CONTINUED WITH 
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
PROCEDURES TO CONCEIVE A 
CHILD AFTER THE PARTIES' 
SEPARATION INTENDING TO HOLD 
HIM AS THE LEGAL FATHER 
The parties separated on May 3, 1991. Thereafter, Barbara 
Krambule continued to undergo artificial insemination procedures. 
Barbara Krambule did not advise Rick Krambule she was continuing 
to try to conceive a child by means of artificial insemination. 
(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 19). Barbara Krambule 
conceived on June 23, 1992 by means of artificial insemination. 
She gave birth to Mathew Krambule on March 24, 1992. 
Barbara Krambule relies on the Consent to Perform Procedures 
to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination agreement 
arguing Rick Krambule should be determined to be the legal father 
of Mathew Krambule. This agreement refers to the parties as 
"husband and wife". Paragraph 2 states "we hereby affirm our 
desire to achieve pregnancy and request ..." Page 5 of the 
agreement is signed as husband and wife. A reasonable 
interpretation of the contract would be the intent of the parties 
at the time of execution of the contract was that of a viable 
couple desiring to achieve a pregnancy by artificial insemination 
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because of sterility. 
Paragraph 8 of the contract states that the parties' 
participation in the artificial insemination procedure(s) is 
voluntary. Barbara Krambule owed Rick Krambule a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing and should have advised him of her 
continued participation in the artificial insemination program. 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if 
not all contractual relationships. St. Benedict's Dev. vs. St. 
Benedict's Hosp. . 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991) . 
When one party to a contract retains power or sole 
discretion in an express contract, it must exercise that 
discretion reasonably and in good faith. Olympus Hills Center, 
LTD. v. Smith's Food. 889 P.2d 445, 450-451, (Utah App. 1994) 
cert, denied 889 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); Cook v. Zions First Nat'1 
Bank. 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996). 
Compliance with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
depends upon the agreed common purpose and justified expectations 
of the parties. Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 
285, 291 (Utah App. 1994). Good faith and fair dealing are fact 
sensitive concepts and whether there is a breach of good faith 
and fair dealing is a factual issue generally inappropriate for 
decision as a matter of law. Cook v. Zion's First Nat'1 Bank, 
919 P.2d 56, 60-61 (Utah App. 1996); Republic Group, Inc. vs. 
Won-Door Corp. . 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994) . 
Without knowledge of Barbara Krambule's continued efforts to 
become pregnant by means of artificial insemination, Rick 
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Krambule was unable to protect his legal rights in this matter. 
Barbara Krambule acting alone held the power and the ability to 
become pregnant without the consent and assistance of Rick 
Krambule. Barbara Krambule has not acted in good faith and fair 
dealing by withholding knowledge of her continued attempts to 
become pregnant. Without specific knowledge of Barbara 
Krambule's continued efforts to become pregnant, Rick Krambule 
has not voluntarily participated in the artificial insemination 
procedure (s) . 
In the case of In Re: Marriage of Witback-Wildhagen, 667 
N.E. 2d 122 (111. App.4 Dist. 1996). The appellate court of 
Illinois interpreted the Illinois artificial insemination statute 
and also addressed the issue of obtaining the actual consent of 
the husband. Illinois has a statute holding if under the 
supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of the 
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by 
a man not her husband, the husband shall be treated in law as if 
he were the natural father of the child thereby conceived. 
Because the Illinois statute requires the physician to 
certify the date of insemination, the Court concluded the 
husband's written consent is required each time his wife is to 
undergo the procedure. Such a requirement is not burdensome and 
leaves no room for confusion on the part of the married couple or 
the physician regarding whether a consent previously given by the 
husband is still viable. 
In Witback-Wildhagen. the Illinois court went on to hold the 
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husband not to be the legal father of the child because he did 
not consent to the artificial insemination procedure. 
Actual consent of Rick Krambule to the artificial 
insemination procedure after his separation should be a factual 
determination made by the trial court and not ruled as a matter 
of law in a Motion for Summary Judgment. Fundamental fairness 
requires that Rick Krambule be given notice of Barbara Krambule's 
continued efforts to become pregnant after the parties' separated 
in order to make an informed decision; i.e., act voluntarily. 
Ill 
BARBARA KRAMBULE SHOULD BE 
ESTOPPED FROM ALLEGING RICK 
KRAMBULE BE ADJUDICATED THE 
FATHER PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINES 
OF ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA 
Mathew Krambule was born on March 24, 1992. Barbara 
Krambule did not file an action to seek support and enforce her 
alleged contractual rights until July, 1996. More than four (4) 
years elapsed from filing her Petition after the parties' Divorce 
Decree. Barbara Krambule should be estopped from claiming Rick 
Krambule is the father of the child. 
A party alleging equitable estoppel bears the burden of 
proving three (3) elements: representation, reliance, and 
detriment. Weise v. Weise. 699 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1985); 
Masters v. Worsley. 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989). 
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Also, in State v. Irizarry. 893 P.2d 1107, 1109-1110 (Utah 
App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals held the Doctrine of 
Equitable Estoppel has three (3) elements: (1) a statement, 
admission, or failure to act by one (1) party inconsistent with a 
later asserted claim; (2) the other parties' reasonable action or 
inaction based upon the first parties' statement, admission, act, 
or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would 
result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
its statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
In 1992, Barbara Krambule and her then attorney signed the 
Stipulation which did not acknowledge Rick Krambule was the 
father of Mathew Krambule. Even though Barbara Krambule's 
attorney in a letter dated December 3, 1991 stated she was going 
to make an issue of the parentage of Mathew, she later signed the 
Stipulation which did not address Mathew Krambule. Also, Barbara 
Krambule's attorney signed the Findings of Fact and Decree 
approved as to form. 
Rick Krambule reasonably relied upon Barbara Krambule's 
statement, admission, act, or failure to make parentage of Mathew 
an issue. In reliance upon Barbara Krambule's inaction regarding 
Mathew Krambule, Rick Krambule paid for Barbara Krambule's 
college education and alimony. Also, Rick Krambule intentionally 
had no contact with Mathew Krambule in reliance upon Barbara 
Krambule's conduct. 
Equitable Estoppel is only invoked when the conduct and 
circumstances would otherwise perpetrate a fraud or unfair 
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advantage. Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 
1989). Barbara Krambule by failing to advise Rick Krambule of 
continued efforts to achieve a pregnancy after the parties' 
separation, took an unfair advantage of Rick Krambule and she 
should be equitably estopped from asserting Rick Krambule be 
declared the legal father of Mathew. 
Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata not only prevent 
litigation of a claim actually litigated in a previous hearing, 
it also prevents the litigation of claims that could have or 
should have been litigated in the prior action but were not. 
Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah App. 
1994); Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988) 
Res Judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. Cooper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 
389 (Utah App. 1987). Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of 
claims that have been fully litigated between the same parties, 
and also precludes claims which could have and should have been 
litigated in the prior action but were not raised. Id. at 389. 
In Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444-445 (Utah 1995), the 
Utah Supreme Court held plaintiffs were barred in suing 
defendants under a breach of contract theory as the breach of 
contract theory claim could and should have been brought in the 
fraud and negligence Complaint in their first lawsuit. Barbara 
Krambule's parentage claim for Mathew against Rick Krambule 
should be barred by the claims preclusion branch of res judicata. 
See also Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 
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1357 (Utah App. 1990). 
IV 
BARBARA KRAMBULE WAIVED ANY 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS GRANTED 
UNDER THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
CONTRACT 
Barbara Krambule claims the artificial insemination 
agreement executed by the parties is a binding contract and Rick 
Krambule has breached his contract with her. The undisputed 
facts in this case indicate Barbara Krambule continued with 
artificial insemination procedures and became pregnant seven 
weeks after separating from Rick Krambule. Rick Krambule had no 
knowledge Barbara Krambule was continuing with the artificial 
insemination procedures. Rick Krambule had no control over 
Barbara Krambule's actions after the parties separated. In this 
case, Barbara Krambule and her then attorney signed the 
Stipulation and her attorney signed the Findings and Decree of 
Divorce approved as to form which did not address the issue of 
Mathew Krambule. Barbara Krambule took no action regarding her 
contractual rights for a period in excess of four (4) years. 
Barbara Krambule has intentionally waived any contractual rights 
she may have acquired under the artificial insemination 
agreement. 
In Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah 
App. 1994), the Court of Appeals held waiver of a contractual 
right occurs when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a 
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manner inconsistent with its contractual rights, and as a result, 
prejudice accrues to the opposing party to the contract. Waiver 
requires that there be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, 
knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it. 
B.R. Woodward Marketing. Inc. v. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99, 101 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
In Findings of Fact No. 9. of Findings of Fact of Modifica-
tion of Decree of Divorce the trial court found, 
a. During late October, 1991 after Barbara Krambule's 
pregnancy with Mathew became known, Barbara Krambule told Rick 
Krambule that she only wanted the Krambule name for Mathew and 
nothing more from him; 
b. Barbara Krambule essentially made the same statement to 
Rick Krambule's sister sometime later; 
c. After Rick Krambule filed for divorce, Barbara Krambule 
initially requested support for the expected child through her 
then attorney, but later signed a Stipulation silent on the 
matter of the child. She further allowed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce to issue without any 
mention of Mathew though he was born at that time. 
d. During the divorce process, Barbara Krambule was very 
emotional about the matter and spent some time in the hospital in 
December, 1991 as a result. Nevertheless, she testified that her 
decision to make no claim for Mathew was carefully considered and 
was made during the period of time she had the assistance of 
counsel. 
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e. She filed her Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce 
and for paternity as to Mathew on July 15, 1996, four years and 
three months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. Filing of 
the Petition was precipitated by Rick Krambule's failure to 
accept responsibility for Mathew following counseling by the 
parties as to how the matter concerning the child's fatherless 
circumstance should be handled. 
Such intentional conduct on the part of Barbara Krambule 
amounts to waiver of a known existing contractual right. The 
trial court should have heard evidence adduced at a trial as to 
whether there has been a waiver of contractual rights under the 
artificial insemination agreement. 
Under the doctrine of waiver the unexpressed, subjective 
reasons for relinquishment of a right are largely irrelevant. 
The question whether waiver will be found in any particular case 
depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom 
it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has had 
upon the other party. Stated another way, one cannot prevent a 
waiver by a private mental reservation contrary to an intent to 
waive, where his or her actions clearly indicate such an intent. 
B.R. Wood Marketing v. Collins Food. 754 P.2d 99, 103 (Utah App. 
1988). Barbara Krambule did not have the right to wait until she 
was strong and healthy to proceed with her claim of support for 
for Mathew. (4/30/98 TR. at 97). She was required to proceed 
immediately and not wait for over four (4) years. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Modified Decree of Divorce entered July 8, 1998, should 
be set aside inasmuch as the Court granted a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment ruling Rick Krambule to be the legal father of 
Mathew Krambule as a matter of law. There exists genuine 
disputes over material facts in this case and granting summary 
judgment was inappropriate. The case should be remitted back to 
the trial court for trial on the issues of whether Rick Krambule 
is the father of Mathew Krambule pursuant to the artificial 
insemination contract. There exist genuine disputes of material 
facts whether Rick Krambule acted voluntarily under the contract, 
whether Barbara Krambule breached her duty of good faith and fair 
dealing with the contract, whether Rick Krambule was entitled to 
be notified of Barbara Krambule continued participation with 
artificial insemination procedures, whether Barbara Krambule is 
estopped or barred by the doctrine of res judicata from asserting 
her claim against Rick Krambule, and whether Barbara Krambule has 
waived contractual rights. 
DATED this ^ ^ a y of March, 1999. 
+LJ£> 
NEEI ROBERT L . LEY 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
A p p e l l a n t , R i c k D. Kafarabule 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT RICKY D. 
KRAMBULE to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for Appellee Barbara R. 
Karmbule, Key Bank Building, Suite 200, 2491 Washington 
Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
1. Deposition Exhibit No. 1 of Barbara Krambule's Deposition, 
Contract to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through 
Artificial Insemination 
2. Deposition Exhibit No. 2 of Barbara Krambule's Deposition, 
Attorney letter dated December 3, 1991 
3. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
4. Order on Motion for Summary Judgment 
5. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Modified Decree of 
Divorce 
6. Modified Decree of Divorce 
7. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Decree of Divorce 
8. Decree of Divorce 
9. Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
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May-04-97 11:33A Chris Norton (801) 777-2099 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 
AND 
DIVISION OF UROLOGY 
CONSENT TO PERFORM PROCEDURES1 TO ACHIEVE PREGNANCY 
THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION OF DONOR SEMEN 
1. Wef as husband and* wifef"acknowledge that we have been 
unable to achieve a pregnancy because of one or more of the 
following conditions* notwithstanding thorough evaluation and 
therapy: 
(A) Abnormality of the semenf including reduced 
numbers, and/or quality or absence of sperm; 
<B> Cervical diseasei including immobilization of the 
sperm! 
(C) Endometriosis; 
t< D) Other causes ^ including* unexplained mfert I 11 ty; 
(E) Or have genetic problems. 
2« We hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy and 
request that artificial insemination procedures be utilized in ^n 
attempt to achieve pregnancy in the" wif e/* wi th semen obtained from 
an unidentified and undisclosed third Bartv donor<s>-
(A) In order t^o facilitate the success of this 
procedurei **we ^ wagreV r to^f o 1 low procedures and 
complete > d^ociimentVtfi'on as outlined by the 
Department of^  Obstetrics and/or the Division of 
Urology of *^ thV'* •Urnverslt9***of Utah School* of** 
Medicine; 
3, cWe 'are ^aware/on the* basVs* bf/preseht information, the* 
fehancesrtKa't Tar pregnancy iw~i H^ibeHllac'hieved^by w -the ^ artificials* 
insemination -procedure(s ) thare "Jt^O-ySY* through six cycles, and.** 
acknowledge that* no >* rep^esenta>t 1'OTJ.S a *o IT guarantees, express^r^ 
implied, have been made^oto £,us iwi^ bh ^ fespect to whether-the,*, 
procedures > will be successful*^ 
«j *+* We have been fuljy i^ jj^ orineji of^^all known significant 
and substantial risks <>incidentv to* a^jyfc^ f icial insemination? 
whether fresh or frozen semen is used> which include: 
1 
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(A) Bleeding and/or infection; 
<B> Pain associated Kith the various procedures; 
(C) Discomfort and complictians connected with 
pregnancy, childbirth ana delivery; 
<D) Birth of an infant or infants suffering from any 
birth defect(s), or of abnormalities of any kind* 
including but not limited to infection(s) or 
disease(s) transmitted through donor semen; 
<E) Uncertainty of genetic, hereditary traits or 
tendencies of such offspring; 
(F) Other adverse consequences of any kind, which are 
unknown but may arise or be connected directly or 
indirectly to the artificial insemination and/or 
procedureCs)-
5. We acknowledge that if pregnancy is achieved there is 
no assurance of a live or healthy birth, or of a normal genetic 
contribution from the donor's sperm, and that in any event* all 
pregnancies face a 3-V/» risk of some birth defect. 
6. Ule have been offered the option of carrier testing or 
chromosome testing of the donor if there is a history of 
autosomal recessive trait or a heritable chromosomal 
translocation in the wife. 
7. Ue have had an unlimited opportunity to ask questions 
about the procedureCs) and the risks involved* and our questions 
have been fully answered to our satisfaction. 
8. We acknowledge that our participation in the artificial 
insemination procedureCs) is voluntary. 
9. In order to artificially inseminate the wife, the 
doctor hereafter identified shall obtain the necessary semen from 
a third party donor, selected by the doctor. The donor shall not 
at any time be advised of the identity of the wife, nor of the 
success or failure of the insemination. The undersigned, and 
each of them, agree that the identity of the donor shall not be 
divulged to them or any offspring resulting from such 
insemination for any reason by the doctor, except upon the 
issuance of a duly authorized order of court of competent 
jurisdiction, the issuance of which shall not be sought by the 
undersigned. The doctor shall require the donor to agree in 
writing not to seek out the identity of the undersigned. 
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10. We jointly and severally agree to recognize and accept 
the full legal* moral, parentali financial, social, emotional and 
cultural responsibility and care of any offspring that may result 
from any pregnancy achieved through the artificial insemination 
procedure(s). We also mutually and individually agree to accept 
and assume the same duties* obligations and responsibilities 
toward such offspring to the full extent in the same manner as 
owed by the undersigned to naturally occurring offspring, and 
acknowledge and agree that any offspring resulting from the 
artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be their legal heir(s) 
and that the said offspring shall be, for all purposes, the child 
of the husband And wife, and the husband shall for all purposes 
be considered the father of the said offspring. 
11. The doctor in consultation with husband and wife may 
use fresh or frozen semen from one or more unidentified donors, 
to select the donor(s), including the laboratory which has 
collected, processed and stored the semen, It is understood that 
risk factors set forth in paragraph M A ) , <C), & (D) ar& greater 
where fresh sperm is used, but we accept those risks. 
IE. We hereby covenant and agree, without reservation of 
right, in law or equity, to indemnifyf hold harmless and release 
the doctor, the persons who are the donors of the semen, those 
persons who collect, store, and/or preserve and manipulate the 
semen specimens, the University of Utan, the university of Utah 
Hospital, the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology* the 
Division of Urology, their officers* employees and agents from 
any and all liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, in 
any manner connected with or related to: 
(A) Complications of pregnancy; 
(B) Complications in any manner connected with child 
birth and/or delivery; 
(C) Birth of any infant or infants suffering from any 
birth defecti or of abnormalities of any kind, 
including but not limited to infections or 
transmitted diseased throuqh donor semen; 
(D) Genetic, hereditary traits or tendencies of such 
offspring; 
(E) Any other adverse consequences of any kind that 
may arise or be connected directly or indirectly 
to or in any manner with offspring resulting from 
the artificial insemination and/or procedure(s) 
herein authorized or contemplated. 
13. We agree, individually and severally, that neither of 
them will at any time, or for any reason assist, aid or abet in 
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any way, any person, including any child or offspring in 
initiating or pursuing any claim or legal proceeding with respect 
to any matter arising out of, or resulting from the artificial 
insemination procedure(s) authorized herein. 
14-. -" We agree and acknowledge that the procedures (s) 
authorized herein shall be considered for all purposes, medical 
services. 
15. With the above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in mind* we, individually 
and as h u s b a n d and wife, hereby c o n s e n t to> requ e s t and authorize 
D r . V N; c < "A t who is herein referred to as "our 
doctor," and such assistants and associates as our doctor may 
designate, no undertake one or more artificial insemination 
procedures in an attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife, 
understanding and accepting all the risks and responsibilities 
attendant thereto. 
16. Confident iali tv. We understand that our doctor, the 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urology 
and the University of Utah, will consider the information 
developed about us during this treatment as confidential, and 
that neither our identity nor specific medical details will be 
revealed by any of them without our prior consent, however, 
specific medical details may be revealed in professional 
publications, but our identify is not to be revealed- We 
understand that in the event an authorized government agency 
reviews this or other documents) they may learn of our identity. 
17. Procedures Authorized to Treat Unforeseen Conditions, 
We recognize that during the course of any of the procedures 
outlined above, unforeseen conditions may necessitate additional 
or different procedures than those set forth above. In the event 
we authorise and request our doctor, his assistants or his 
designees! to perform such procedures as are in the exercise of 
professional judgment necessary and desirable. 
18. We acknowledge that the University of Utah, the 
University of Utah School of Medicine, the Department of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urologyi and all 
officers and employees, including our doctor, are subject to the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-
.1, et sea., U-C.A. 1953 as amended> which Act controls all 
procedures and limitations with respect to claims of liability. 
19. Consent Agreement Binding Upon the Heirs. This Consent 
Agreement shall be binding upon our administ 
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20. Signatures. We acknowledge by our signatures below 
that we have read the foregoing and that all questions pertaining 
thereto have been answered to our satisfaction. 
UNDERSIGNED: 
ui i f g i t^ -vv .z&^rsjr n -Yyc^Ar-„ ft-1 
Date: I 9: - ^,;V^ - <"•< C > 
•3 
Husband: ~ U — J '- * 
Date: "1 / L./1_/JL_^: 
WITNESS: 
SIGNATURE OF DOCTOR ^PROVID 
THE ABOVE INFORMATION: 
ING 
D a t e : " " M y - ^ E> 
t w ^ 
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Tab 2 
PETE N VLAHOS 
H DON SHARP 
GERALO S WIGHT 
JOHN W BRADLEY 
Vlahos} Sharp & Wight 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
LEGAL FORUM BUILOING 244 7 KlESEL AVENUE 
OGDEN. UTAH 8440J 
PHONE (801) 621-2464 
FAX (801) 621-6218 
December 3, 1991 
Attorney Robert L, 
2485 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Neeley 
RE; Krambule vs. Krambule 
My File No- 400-11909-V 
Dear Robert: 
In connection with the above matter, my client has 
recently brought to my attention an item that she debated 
at great lengths whether she should or should not pursue 
and has finally decided she's going to pursue it. 
Your client and my client agreed to artificial insem-
ination so that the parties could have another child. 
This artificial insemination was in fact conducted 
and as a result my client is pregnant and expecting a 
child. 
She is somewhere between 4 and 6 months pregnant 
and since he agreed to the artificial insemination and 
shefs going to obtain for me his written consent, the 
child is his and I've tried this before where the Court 
has acknowledged these types of agreements. 
My client has indicated that if he will not put up 
a fuss over this child, pay the child support in accordance 
with the schedule for the children, then she would give up 
any claim she has to alimony. 
In addition, she indicated that she would allow 
overnight visits on Mondays and Wednesdays and when school 
is not in session, which would include holidays and summer 
vacation. 




Attorney Robe - L. Neeley 
Re: Krambule \ . Krambule 
Page 2 
and if we can work out a Stipulation along those lines, let 
me know. 
The Stipulation you sent me does not provide for that 
and my client is not willing to sign it. 
I did forward to her a copy, she has it, and that's 
what brought this to mind because she does not feel that 
this child should be left out and the parties would then 
have two children, Stephanie and whatever this child turns 
out to be, whether it's a boy or a girl. 
Please review this with your client and get back with 
me and if we can resolve it great and if not, then let's 
get it tried. I don't believe we've had a Pre-trial yet and 
if your client is not willing to negotiate this item then 
one or both of us should file a request for Pre-trial. 
I will await your response. I remain, 
PNV:kh 
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LAYTON DISTRICT COURT 
27 2 06 PM f98 
ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 




IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge: Darwin Hanson 
The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin 
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment, 
the court having reviewed materials submitted by counsel and having heard argument from the 
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore, the court makes 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court does not have the evidentiary information necessary to make a 
determination as to the amount of child support, medical expenses and other financial 
determinations that have been raised by the parties in their pleadings. 
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2. The court is treating this matter as a motion for partial summary judgment 
and will rule solely in the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is the legal father of the minor child 
in question. 
3. The Plaintiff is not the biological father of the minor child. 
4. In modern society, birth is possible by artificial insemination other means. 
Consequently, the court must look at the facts surrounding the artificial insemination to determine 
the legal obligations of the parties engaged in that type of conception. 
5. The court finds that on July 18, 1990 the parties entered into a contract 
entitled, "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination 
of Donor Sperm". The court finds that this contract obligated the Plaintiff and the Defendant to 
assume the legal responsibility for the child that was produced from artificial insemination. This 
legal duty included all of the rights of a minor child of natural parents. 
6. The court finds that this was the second contract the parties had entered into 
of this nature and that a child was produced from the first contract for which both parties have 
assume the full rights as natural parents. 
7. The court finds that in order for this contract to be null and void, an event 
must occur which would terminate the contract. The court does not rule on all the events that could 
terminate such a contract, however, in this case the court rules that a divorce could have terminated 
the contract. The court finds that in this case the child was conceived during the marriage and bom 
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8. The court finds there is a strong public policy to protect the interest of a 
minor child. A separation of the parties is not sufficient to repudiate the contract and the court 
finds that only a divorce obtained prior to the conception of the child would be sufficient to 
repudiate the contract in this case. 
9. The court finds that the Plaintiff is legally the father of the minor child, 
Matthew, who was born on March 24, 1992. 
10. The Plaintiff has all of the obligations and rights associated with being the 
natural parent of Matthew. 
11. The remaining issues that have not been resolved shall be set for a trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a legally binding contract for 
artificial insemination. 
2. The contract was not repudiated by the separation of the parties and in this 
case could only be repudiated by a divorce which occurred prior to the conception of the child. 
3. The child in this case, Matthew, was conceived and born prior to the divorce 
of the parties. 
4. The contract is binding between the parties and imposes on both parties the 
legal responsibilities of natural parents to the child. 
5. The court rules that the Plaintiff has the same legal responsibilities and rights 
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6. The remaining issues that have been unresolved shall be set for an 
evidentiary trial. 
DATED this of March, 1998. 
DARWIN HANSON 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit 
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature 
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) 
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED thisxCday of March, 1998. 
t>c*o^ 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s): 
Robert L. Neeley 
2485 Grant Ave., #200 
Ogden,UT 84401 
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OKTMDWWWWW 
tot! 2«Fft'S8 ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 801-393-2300 
Facsimile: 801-393-2340 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge: "XX,0;W ^ -
The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin 
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment, 
the court having reviewed materials submitted by counsel and having heard argument from the 
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The court grants the Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. 
2. The Plaintiff has all the legal obligations and rights of a natural parent in 
regard to Matthew Krambule, born on March 24,1992. 




DATED t h i s ^ T d a y of March, 1998. 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit 
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature 
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) 
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this^i . day of March, 1998. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s): 
Robert L. Neeley 
2485 Grant Ave., #200 
Ogden, UT 84401 
lis DATED this ay of March, 1998. 
-—~"LEGAL ASSISTANT 
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JUL 9 4 IO f.J ' 3c ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Respondent 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 




IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge: 
The above entitled matter came before the court on the 30th day of April, 1998 on 
Respondent's Petition for Modification. The Petitioner was present in court represented by his 
attorney Robert L. Neeley and the Respondent was present in court represented by her attorney 
Robert A. Echard. The court having received testimony, exhibits, arguments and the contents of 
the legal memorandum, now therefore the court makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married on the 31 st day of March, 1979. 
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2. Two (2) children were conceived by artificial insemination and born during the 
course of the marriage, namely: STEPHANIE KRAMBULE, born on January 29, 1985 and 
MATTHEW WADE KRAMBULE, born on March 24, 1992. 
3. A Decree of Divorce was signed and entered by the Court on the 3rd day of 
April, 1992. 
4. At the time of the Divorce, the Petitioner monthly income was $3,250.00 and 
the Respondent's monthly income was $2,042.00. 
5. The present annual income of the parties is as follows: 
Petitioner: 
a. Wages - Alpine Paving Mgnmt. $75,000.00 
b. Alpine Paving and Const. $37,317.00 
c. Rent $18,613.00 
TOTAL $130,930.00 
Therefore, Petitioner's current monthly income is $10,911.00. 
The court does not credit line 7 of the Respondent's Exhibit 7 as income for child 
support because it is the finding of the court that the sum of $44,132.00 is necessary retained 
earnings of the company to operate the business during the coming accounting year of the business. 
Under Section 78-45-7.5(4)(a) UCA, monies for business expenses are not considered income for 
child support purposes. 
Respondent: 
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Therefore, Respondent's current monthly income is $3,538.00. 
6. The Decree of Divorce is silent concerning Matthew, but provides the following 
for Stephanie: 
a. Paragraph 2 gives custody of Stephanie to the Respondent; 
b. Paragraph 3 gives Petitioner standard visitation; 
c. Paragraph 5 awards Respondent $326.00 per month for child support; 
d. Paragraph 7 requires each to pay one-half of the daycare expenses for 
Stephanie. 
7. The Petitioner is current with the payment of child support for Stephanie 
through August, 1997, at which time she began living with Petitioner. The court makes no finding 
or order from that date forward in that Petitioner has a Petition for Change of Custody as to 
Stephanie which is presently pending. 
8. The Petitioner previously disclaimed paternity and therefore denied any legal 
responsibility for Matthew in that Respondent conceived after the parties separated. This court has 
heretofore ruled pursuant to Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement that given the 
factual predicate of this case, Petitioner is the legal father of Matthew and therefore has the legal 
duties of a biological father. Petitioner, however, alleges that Respondent should be estopped from 
now claiming past legal benefits for Matthew in that she engaged in conduct at the time of the 
divorce which reasonably induced Petitioner to rely thereon to his detriment. 
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a. During late October, 1991, after Respondent's pregnancy with Matthew 
became known, Respondent told Petitioner that she only wanted the Krambule name for Matthew 
and nothing more from him; 
b. She essentially made the same statement to Petitioner's sister sometime 
later. 
c. After Petitioner filed fro divorce, she initially requested support for the 
expectant child through her then attorney, but later signed a stipulation silent on the matter of the 
child. She further allowed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce to issue 
without any mention of Matthew though he was born at the time. 
d. During the divorce process, Respondent was very emotional about the 
matter and spent some time in the hospital in December, 1991 as a result. Nevertheless, she 
testified that her decision to make no claim for Matthew was carefully considered and was made 
during the period she had the assistance of counsel. 
e. She filed her petition to modify the Decree of Divorce and for Paternity 
as to Matthew on July 15,1996,4 years and 3 months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The 
filing of the Petition was precipitated by Petitioner's failure to accept responsibility for Matthew 
following counseling by the parties as to how the matter concerning the child's fatherless 
circumstance should be handled. 
10. In return for Respondent's failure to act, or to make claim against Petitioner for 
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education at Weber State University in Ogden, Utah, and preceded to live his life without 
consideration as to any financial obligation for Matthew. 
11. Respondent has incurred the following medical debts for herself and Matthew 
from the time of her conception with Matthew until the filing of her Petition to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce: 













12. Respondent has incurred the following child care expenses for Stephanie and 
Matthew since the entry of the Decree of Divorce: 
Child Year Amount 
Stephanie 
Stephanie 

























13, Respondent's reasonable monthly needs for her and both children are as 
follows: 
Item (family expenses^) 
Mortgage on home 
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Utilities 
Phone 




























Each child's need is therefore equal to 1/3 of the family expenses plus Vi of the children's expenses 
or $915.00. 
14. Respondent has incurred attorney's fees regarding her Petition for Modification 
and for Paternity as follows: 
Nature of Charge Rate Amount 
Attorney fees $150/hr. $5,803.13 
The total amount does not include fees associated with Petitioner's pending Modification of Decree 
of Divorce concerning a change of custody of Stephanie. Moreover, it appears that the approximate 
number of hours expended is 39 which the court finds reasonable given the nature of the issues 
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15. The court also finds that Respondent is in need of assistance in paying the 
attorney's fees. She has been using her credit card to make ends meet. She has received no 
assistance from Petitioner for her medical care or for Stephanie's child care heretofore itemized 
above. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
2. Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and 
control of Matthew with Petitioner having a reasonable right of visitation based on the statutory 
guidelines. 
3. The parties combined income exceeds the highest amount set forth in the Basic 
Combined Child Support Obligation Table. The Court therefore applies the Common Law in 
determining what a reasonable child support should be. Based on Finding No. 12(?) above, a 
reasonable child support should be the percentage of the parties income to the combined total 
multiplied by $915.00. The combined income is $10,911.00 plus $3,538.00 which equals 
$14,449.00. Petitioner's gross income is 75.5% of that total. Therefore, Petitioner should pay to 
Respondent 75.5% of the demonstrated child support. 75.5% of $915.00 is $691.00 for each child. 
Therefore, Respondent should be awarded child support from the Petitioner for both children in 
the total sum of $1,382.00 per month beginning with the month of August, 1996, which is the 
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4. The Court concludes that the child support should be retroactive to the date 
stated above for the following reasons: 
a. Stephanie: Petitioner has resisted a child support increase for 
Stephanie though his income has significantly increased since the divorce was granted. This is 
demonstrated by most, if not all, of the child support checks having the initial's B.Q.F.O. written 
on each. Petitioner testified that the initials stand for "Bitch Queen F Off." The initials started 
appearing soon after Petitioner remarried. The Court concludes that the only reason for placing 
initials of that kind on a child support check is to intimidate and manipulate. Conduct of that kind 
only protracts litigation and does not contribute to a timely resolution. 
b. Matthew: The Court concludes that Petitioner is legally responsible 
for paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statute limits the period to four (4) years 
prior to the determination of paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past child 
support based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel if applicable. In this matter, the Court finds 
that Respondent's conduct, or lack thereof, during the pregnancy and divorce proceedings, is 
sufficient to disallow payment for back child support beyond the date she filed for a determination 
of Matthew's paternity based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel. 
5. Therefore, the Court finds that Respondent should be awarded judgment against 
Petitioner for back child support as follows: 
a. Stephanie: The amount of the judgment equals $691.00 per month 
for 13 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending August, 1997 when Stephanie began living 
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The amount is $4,745.00. The period from August, 1997 to date is yet to be determined in 
connection with Petitioner's Petition for Modification. 
b. Matthew: The amount of the judgment is $691.00 per month for 
20 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending April, 1998) which equals $13,820.00. Therefore, 
the total judgment for past due child support is $18,565.00 
6. Each of the parties should be ordered to pay one-half of all future child care for 
the children according to the applicable statutory provisions. 
7. Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner for past due child 
care pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce as follows: 
a. Stephanie: The past due child care is calculated as follows: 
Year Amount 
1992 $361 divided by 2 multiplied $135.00 
by 0.75 (April through Dec.) 
$1627 divided by 4 $407.00 
1993 $835.70 divided by 2 $418.00 
Total $960.00 
b. Matthew: The past due child care is only applicable from August, 
1996 through April, 1998 based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel as follows: 
Year Amount 
1996 $969 times 0.42 (5 months 
of the year) divided by 2 






8. The Court concludes that Respondent should keep medical insurance on the 
children in accordance with the applicable statute regarding the sharing of the premiums and costs 
not covered by the policy. The Court makes no award for past medical expenses because they are 
not applicable as to Matthew under the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the evidence was 
insufficient to break out those expenses applicable to Respondent individually and those applicable 
to the pregnancy and birth of Matthew. 
9. Petitioner should be awarded Stephanie as an exemption on his IRS return and 
Respondent should be awarded Matthew as an exemption on her IRS return. At such time as 
Stephanie is no longer eligible to be taken by Petitioner, then the parties should alternate Matthew 
as an exemption with Petitioner taking him the first year after Stephanie is not long eligible. 
Petitioner's right to take either of the children as an exemption in any year is contingent upon his 
being current with his child support payments to Respondent as of the end of that particular year. 
10. Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner for attorney's fees 
in the sum of $5,803.00 and costs as taxed by the Court pursuant to an appropriate application by 
Respondent. 
DATED t h i s ' y day of-Mayf 1998. 
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Respondent 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 




IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Respondent. 
MODIFIED DECREE OF 
DIVORCE 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge: 
The above entitled matter came before the court on the 30th day of April, 1998 on 
Respondent's Petition for Modification. The Petitioner was present in court represented by his 
attorney Robert L. Neeley and the Respondent was present in court represented by her attorney 
Robert A. Echard. The court having received testimony, exhibits, arguments and the contents of 
the legal memorandum, now therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Respondent is awarded the care, custody and control of Matthew with Petitioner 
having a reasonable right of visitation based on the statutory guidelines. 
2. The parties combined income exceeds the highest amount set forth in the Basic 
Combined Child Support Obligation Table. The Court therefore applies the Common Law in 
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determining what a reasonable child support should be. Child support shall be the percentage of 
the parties income to the combined total multiplied by $915.00. The combined income is 
$10,911.00 plus $3,538.00 which equals $14,449.00. Petitioner's gross income is 75.5% of that < 
total. Therefore, Petitioner shall pay to Respondent 75.5% of the demonstrated child support. 
75.5% of $915.00 is $691.00 for each child. The Respondent is awarded child support from the 
Petitioner for both children in the total sum of $1,382.00 per month beginning with the month of 
August, 1996, which is the month following the month Respondent filed her Petition for 
Modification. 
3- . The child support shall be retroactive to the date stated above for the following 
reasons: 
a. Stephanie: Petitioner has resisted a child support increase for 
Stephanie though his income has significantly increased since the divorce was granted. This is 
demonstrated by most, if not all, of the child support checks having the initial's B.Q.F.O. written 
on each. Petitioner testified that the initials stand for "Bitch Queen F Off." The initials started 
appearing soon after Petitioner remarried. The Court concludes that the only reason for placing 
initials of that kind on a child support check is to intimidate and manipulate. Conduct of that kind 
only protracts litigation and does not contribute to a timely resolution. 
b. Matthew: The Court concludes that Petitioner is legally responsible 
for paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statute limits the period to four (4) years 
prior to the determination of paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past child 
support based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel if applicable. In this matter, the Court finds 
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b. Matthew: The past due child care is only applicable from August, 
1996 through April, 1998 based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel as follows: 
Year Amount 
1996 $969 times 0.42 (5 months 
of the year) divided by 2 





7. The Respondent shall keep medical insurance on the children in accordance 
with the applicable statute regarding the sharing of the premiums and costs not covered by the 
policy. The Court makes no award for past medical expenses because they are not applicable as 
to Matthew under the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the evidence was insufficient to break out 
those expenses applicable to Respondent individually and those applicable to the pregnancy and 
birth of Matthew. 
8. Petitioner is awarded Stephanie as an exemption on his IRS return and 
Respondent is awarded Matthew as an exemption on her IRS return. At such time as Stephanie is 
no longer eligible to be taken by Petitioner, then the parties shall alternate Matthew as an 
exemption with Petitioner taking him the first year after Stephanie is not long eligible. Petitioner's 
right to take either of the children as an exemption in any year is contingent upon his being current 
with his child support payments to Respondent as of the end of that particular year. 
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9. Respondent is awarded judgment against Petitioner for attorney's fees in the 
sum of $5,803.00 and costs as taxed by the Court pursuant to an appropriate application by 
Respondent. 
DATED this l / day oWfrf, 1998. 
_ C. HANSEN 





SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE 
Plaintiff, : MINUTE ENTRY 
vs. February 10, 1992 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE : 9107 50473 DA 
Defendant. 
TAPE: 1128 COMMISSIONER MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN 
DIGIT: 3666-3877 Lisa Adams, Clerk 
TAPE: 1129 M. Benson, Bailiff 
DIGIT: 1-84 
This is the time set for hearing on a default 
divorce. The plaintiff is present and represented by Robert L. 
Neeley.. 
The plaintiff is sworn and testifies. The parties 
have irreconcilable differences. There has been one minor 
child born as issue of the marriage. The defendant is awarded 
the care, custody and control of the minor child. There is a 
child expected by the defendant but the child is not the 
plaintiff's. 
The plaintiff is awarded the business Alpine Paving & 
Construction. 
The court finds that it has jursidiction over the 
parties and the subject matter. The parties have previously 
entered into a written stipulation which appears to the court 
to be fair and equitable and it is to be incorporated into the 
decree. The plaintiff has proven his allegations in his 
complaint relating to the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. The court will award the Decree of Divorce to 
become final upon entry. Mr. Robert L. Neeley is to prepare 
the final order. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, ] 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Judge: Douglas L. Cornaby 
) Civil No. 910750473 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 10th day of February, 1992, before Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Michael G. Allphin; plaintiff was personally present 
and represented by his attorney, Robert L. Neeley; defendant was 
not personally present nor represented by counsel, Pete N. Vlahos, 
however, the parties having executed a Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement; and plaintiff having been sworn and 
testified, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now 
makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff is a resident of Davis County, State of 
Utah, and has been for more than three months immediately prior to 
commencement of this action. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, 
ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373 
OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-3646 
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having been married on or about the 31st day of March, 1979, in 
Ogden, Weber County, Utah. 
3. That one child has been born as issue to this 
marriage, to-wit: Stephanie Krambule, date of birth January 29, 
1985. That defendant is a fit and proper person to have the care, 
custody and control of said child, subject to plaintiff's 
reasonable and standard rights of visitation. 
4. That the parties have irreconcilable differences for 
which the marriage relationship should be terminated. 
5. That the parties sold their home situated at 703 W. 
650 N., Clearfield, Davis County, Utah; have acquired various items 
of personal property, including a 1987 Jeep Cherokee motor vehicle, 
a savings and checking account, an IRA account, defendant's 
retirement at Hill Air Force Base, household furniture, 
furnishings, fishing boat together with trailer and camping 
equipment, an ownership interest in Alpine Paving Company, and 
personal effects during the course of the marriage. 
6. The parties have no debts or obligations except for 
the mortgage on the home located at 703 W. 650 N., Clearfield, 
Utah. 
7. That defendant is gainfully employed at Hill Air 
Force Base earning $2,042.00 per month, and plaintiff is presently 
employed at Alpine Paving & Construction Company earning $3,250.00 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
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per month. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That each party shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from the other to become final upon entry. 
2. That the terms of the Stipulation and Agreement 
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ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373 
OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-3646 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. 
) 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) 
) 
) Judge: Douglas L. Cornaby 
) Civil No. 910750473 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 10th day of February, 1992, before Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Michael G. Allphin; plaintiff was personally present 
and represented by his attorney, Robert L. Neeley; defendant was 
not personally present nor represented by counsel, Pete N. Vlahos, 
however, the parties having executed a Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement; and plaintiff having been sworn and 
testified, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and 
having made and signed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That each party is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from the other to become final upon entry. 
2. That defend ant is hereby awarded the care, custody 
and control of the parties1 minor child, Stephanie Krambule, date 
of birth January 29, 1985. 
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3. That plaintiff is hereby granted the standard 
visitation rights as utilized by the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, but in addition, shall be entitled to have the 
minor child each Monday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and each 
Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. provided, however, that 
plaintiff shall pick up the minor child from the day care provider 
and shall return the minor child to the defendant's home at the 
time stated above. 
4. That defendant is hereby ordered to maintain the 
parties1 minor child on her health and accident insurance with Hill 
Air Force Base. Each party is hereby ordered to pay one-half the 
non-covered medical and dental expenses incurred for benefit of the 
parties' minor child and incorporate The Standard Medical 
Provisions adopted by the above-entitled Court herein. The 
Standard Medical Provisions is attached hereto and by reference 
made a part of this Decree. In the event defendant does not have 
available to her at her place of employment a medical and health 
plan, plaintiff shall obtain a medical and health plan for benefit 
of the parties' minor child through his employment. 
5. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant 
the sum of $326.00 per month as and for child support based upon 
his gross annual earnings of $39,000.00 per year from Alpine Paving 
& Construction and considering defendant's gross annual earnings of 
010216; 
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$24,500.00 from Hill Air Force Base. 
6. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant 
the sum of $274.00 per month as and for alimony for a period not 
to exceed four years from June 1, 1991 or until defendant graduates 
from Weber State University whichever event comes first; also, 
alimony shall terminate by operation of law, i.e. cohabitation or 
remarriage. 
7. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay one-half 
(1/2) of the day care expense incurred for benefit of the parties' 
minor child care expense. 
8. Plaintiff to pay all reasonable expenses defendant 
may incur for books and tuition at Weber State University as she is 
pursuing a bachelor's degree. Defendant is approximately a 
sophomore in college and plaintiff's obligation to pay for her 
books and tuition shall not extend beyond four years from June 1, 
1991. 
9. That the family home and real property located at 703 
W. 650 N., Clearfield, Utah has been sold and each party has 
received one-half the net sales proceeds, and if there are any 
additional payments received for payment of the reserve account, 
each party shall also divide the same equally. 
10. That defendant is hereby awarded the 1987 Jeep 
Cherokee, her IRA and her retirement at Hill Air Force Base and 
01QS16-? 
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one-half the net sales proceeds from the sale of the home. 
11. That defendant is hereby awarded his IRA, his 
retirement, his interest in Alpine Paving, Inc., his camping 
equipment, fishing boat and camping trailer, and one-half the net 
sale proceeds from the sale of the home. 
12. The parties shall divide equally the joint account 
at Shearson Leheman. 
13. That defendant shall be paid $7,825.0 on or before 
January 31, 1993 as reimbursement of one-half the parties prior 
investment in Alpine Paving, Inc. 
14. That the parties have equitably divided the 
household furniture and furnishings and personal effects, and 
neither party makes any claim upon the other for any item of 
personal property. 
15. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to maintain a life 
insurance policy in the sum of $50,000.0 and defendant is hereby 
ordered to maintain a life insurance in the sum of $10,000.00 and 
each party shall designate their minor child, Stephanie Krambule, 
as beneficiary thereto and each party shall maintain said child as 
beneficiary until she reaches at least 18 years of age. 
16. That plaintiff may be allowed to claim the parties' 
minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as a dependent for purposes of 
computation of his Federal and State Income Taxes if he is current 
OiO.216'1 
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on his child support and he pays any monetary loss defendant may 
incur by reason of not being allowed to claim said child as a 
dependent for tax purposes. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay 
defendant in cash for any loss she may incur prior to defendant 
signing any forms necessary for plaintiff to claim the parties' 
child as a dependent for tax purposes. Defendant to furnish 
plaintiff all necessary tax information no later than February 28 
of each year and plaintiff to advise defendant no later than March 
30 of each year as to his election whether to claim the parties1 
child as a dependent for tax purposes. 
17. That each party shall pay their own attorney fees 
and cost of Court incurred in these proceedings. 
218. That each party is hereby ordered to pay one-half 
of any non-covered medical expense incurred during the course of 
the marriage and each party is hereby ordered to pay any debts and 
obligations they may have incurred since their date of separation 
on or about May 3, 1991. 
19. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to be solely 
responsible for all business debts incurred in connection with 
Alpine Paving, Inc. and shall hold defendant harmless thereon. 
20. In the event defendant decides to move from the 
immediate area, she shall notify plaintiff of her intent to 
relocate, and in any event, plaintiff shall receive a minimum of 
0102165 
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forty-five (45) days actual notification prior to leaving. 
DATED this p day of Aoril, 1992. 
riCHAEL G/ ALLPHIN 
Domestic Relations 
Commissioner 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PETE N.' VLAHQS 
Attorney for Defendant 
0102166' 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STANDARD MEDICAL PROVISIONS 
[Plaintiff] [Defendant] [is] [are] ordered to provide health, accident and dental insurance for 
the benefit of the parties' minor children, with deductible amounts and coverage equal to those in 
existence as of the date of this order for so long as coverage is available through insured's current 
or subsequent place of employment (Plaintiff's - Defendant's) is to be primary insurance. Each parent 
is ordered to pay for one-half of any deductible or non covered amounts for such essential medical or 
dental services or prescriptions related thereto that are not paid by the insurance coverage and to 
provide other parent with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to insure the prompt 
payment of the insured portion of such claims and notify other party of insurance claims as paid. The 
custodial parent is to pay routine office calls. 
Neither parent shall contract for or incur any obligation for orthodontia work or elective 
surgery for the child, or any type of psychological counseling or evaluation for a child, anticipating 
co-payment from other parent without the prior agreement or consent of that parent in writing. The 
non-custodial parent will have the right in advance to have a say in the selection of doctors and 
procedures for any ana all orthodontia, or surgery procedures, or pschological counseling, for which he 
or she is expected to contribute. If such debts are incurred without said consultation, and written 
consent, then the obligating parent shall have the pnmae facie obligation to pay any non insurance 
covered expense. 
If an agreement cannot be reached, then before any (other than emergency), medical, orthodontic 
or pschological counseling be done as a co-obligation, the matter shall be brought back before the 
court. The party found to be unreasonably causing the hearing shall pay costs ana attorney fees. 
For procedures not covered by the insurance but reasonably within the parties ability to pay 
and necessary to the welfare of the child, such as orthodontia cosmetic surgery, or mental medical then 
each party will normally be ordered to Day one-half of the costs associated with such treatments or 
procedures. 
*hen the other parent is expected to be responsible for deductible amounts attributable to 
•nedical or aental expenses incurred for the parties' children, then the incurring parent must provide 
copies of ail receipts associated with those expenses within 30 days of the receipt of any billing 
therefore incurrea. Any claims not maae to the other parent within that time frame in writing will be 
p n m a e facie aeemea waived. The other party is ordered to make their portion ot those payments, or 
-naxe arrangements to ao so within 45 days of receipt OT the aocumentat 1 on supporting required 
participation. 
The party wno nas the nealth ana accident insurance is ordered to maintain it for the benefit 
CT the family until such time as the Decree in this matter is final and to make continued coverage 
available to the soouse under "COBRA"; provided however the spouse taking advantage of said coverage 
shall pay the cost thereof unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 
rUs^MjL LLu&*£ 
Commissioner, Weber) 
County District Court 
(When applicable the standard should be typed into your findings and decree or a typed 
insertion of it shall be attached to the order or decree; not merely referenced) 
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OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-3 64 6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Plaintiff , 
vs. ] 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. y 
) STIPULATION AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
) Judge: 
» civil NO. iicn&iyj 
WHEREAS, the plaintiff above named has commenced an 
action for divorce in the above-entitled Court; and 
WHEREAS, the parties are desirous of stipulating and 
agreeing at this time with respect to the issues raised by said 
action, NOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the 
parties hereto as follows, to-wit: 
1. That plaintiff may have his hearing to obtain a 
mutual divorce in said action at any time without further notice to 
defendant, subject to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation 
and Agreement. 
2. That defendant is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor child, Stephanie Krambule, date of 
birth January 29, 1985. 
STIPULATION 
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3. That plaintiff shall be granetd the standard 
visitation rights as utilized by the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, but in addition, shall be entitled to have the 
minor child each Monday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and each 
Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. provided, however, that 
plaintiff shall pick up the minor child from the day care provider 
and shall return the minor child to the defendant's home at the 
time stated above. 
4. That defendant shall maintain the parties1 minor 
child on her health and accident insurance with Hill Air Force 
Base. Each party shall pay one-half the non-covered medical and 
dental expenses incurred for benefit of the parties1 minor child 
and incorporate The Standard Medical Provisions adopted by the 
above-entitled Court herein. The Standard Medical Provisions is 
attached hereto and by reference made a part of this Stipulation. 
In the event defendant does not have available to her at her place 
of employment a medical and health plan, plaintiff shall obtain a 
medical and health plan for benefit of the parties' minor child 
through his employment. 
5. That plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of 
$326.00 per month as and for child support based upon his gross 
annual earnings of $39,000.00 per year through Alpine Paving & 
Construction and considering defendant's gross annual earnings of 
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$24,500.00 from Hill Air Force Base. 
6. That plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of 
$274.00 per month as and for alimony for a period not to exceed 
four years from June 1, 1991 or until defendant graduates from 
Weber State University whichever event comes first; also, alimony 
shall terminate by operation of law, i.e. cohabitation or 
remarr iage. 
7. That plaintiff shall pay one-half (1/2) of the day 
care expense incurred for benefit of the parties1 minor child and 
defendant shall provide written documentation of the monthly child 
care expense. 
8. Plaintiff to pay all reasonable expenses defendant 
may incur for books and tuition at Weber State University as she is 
pursuing a bachelor's degree. Defendant is approximately a 
sophomore in college and plaintiff's obligation to pay for her 
books and tuition shall not extend beyond four years from June 1, 
1991. 
9. That the family home and real property located at 703 
W. 650 N., Clearfield, Utah has been sold and each party has 
received one-half the net sales proceeds, and if there are any 
additional payments received for payment of the reserve account, 
each party shall also divide the same equally. 
10. That defendant shall be awarded the 1987 Jeep 
^\ 
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Cherokee, her IRA and her retirement at Hill Air Force Base and 
one-half the net sales proceeds from the sale of the home. 
11. That defendant shall be awarded his IRA, his 
retirement, his interest in Alpine Paving, Inc., his camping 
equipment, fishing boat and camping trailer, and one-half the net 
sale proceeds from the sale of the home. 
12. The parties shall divide equally the joint account 
at Shearson Leheman. 
13. That defendant shall be paid $7,825.00 on or before 
January 31, 1993 as reimbursement of one-half the parties prior 
investment in Alpine Paving, Inc. 
14. That the parties have equitably divided the 
household furniture and furnishings and personal effects, and 
neither party makes any claim upon the other for any item of 
personal property. 
15. That plaintiff shall maintain a life insurance 
policy in the sum of $50,000.00 and defendant shall maintain a life 
insurance in the sum of $10,000.00 and each party shall designate 
their minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as beneficiary thereto and 
each shall maintain said child as beneficiary until she reaches at 
least 18 years of age. 
16. That plaintiff may be allowed to claim the parties' 
minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as a dependent for purposes of 
Oh 
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computation of his Federal and State Income Taxes if he is current 
on his child support and he pays any monetary loss defendant may 
incur by reason of not being allowed to claim said child as a 
dependent for tax purposes. Plaintiff shall pay defendant in cash 
for any loss she may incur prior to defendant signing any forms 
necessary for plaintiff to claim the parties' child as a dependent 
for tax purposes. Defendant to furnish plaintiff all necessary tax 
information no later than February 28 of each year and plaintiff to 
advise defendant no later than March 30 of each year as to his 
election whether to claim the parties1 child as a dependent for tax 
purposes. 
17. That each party shall pay their own attorney fees 
and cost of Court incurred in these proceedings. 
18. That each party shall pay one-half of any non-
covered medical expense incurred during the course of the marriage 
and each party shall be responsible to pay any debts and 
obligations they may have incurred since their date of separation 
on or about May 3, 1991. 
19. That plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all 
business debts incurred in connection with Alpine Paving, Inc. and 
shall hold defendant harmless thereon. 
20. In the event defendant decides to move from the 
immediate area, she shall notify plaintiff of her intent to 
STIPULATION 
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relocate, and in any event, plaintiff shall receive a minimum of 
forty-five (45) days actual notification prior to leaving. 




ICKY D. KRAMBULE R 
Plaintiff 
TOBERT L. NEETTEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BARBARA R. KRAtfTBULE 
Defendant 
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IN THE SECC JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT F DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMMISSIONER'S VISITATION GUIDELINES 
Reasonable visitation should be defined as the parents may 
agree. If they are not able to agree, reasonable/standard visitation 
will routinely be defined for school-age (beginning kindergarten) 
children as follows: 
1. Alternate weekends; Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m. 
2. Midweek: Alternate Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
3. Holidays: 
(A) CHRISTMAS - non-custodial parent to have 
Christmas Day beginning at 1 p.m. and continuing through one-half 
of the child's total Christmas school vacation. 
(B) THANKSGIVING & EASTER - non-custodial parent 
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1992, 94, 96, etc.); 
Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m. 
Non-custodial parent to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 9r; 
etc.); Easter holiday is Friday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m. 
(C) OTHER HOLIDAYS - New Year's Day, Martin Luther 
King Day, Presidents' Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 24th, and 
Labor Day. These holidays are to be alternated, with the 
non-custodial parent to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 6 p.m. on the holiday. 
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation and 
no changes should be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend schedule. 
4. Father's Day/Mother's Day: 
As appropriate, 6 p.m. the day before until 6 p.m. 
the day of. 
5. Birthdays; 
One evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during the week 
of the child's birthday and the non-custodial parent's birthday. 
6. Extended Visitation: 
(A) SUMMER - Four weeks continuous, with written notice of 
dates provided to custodial parent by May First. Custodial 
parent to have alternate weekends, holiday, and phone 
visitation. 
(B) YEAR-ROUND SCHOOL - Two two-week periods, with wr.i i • 
notice of dates to custodial parent at least 30 days prio 
visitation. Custodial parent to have holiday, and phone 
visitation during this time. 
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year 
uninterrupted time with the children for purposes of vacation, 
provided the same does not interfere with holiday visitation 
per above. Each parent shall notify the other in writing oi 
such two-week period at least 30 days in advance. 
7. Telephone: - Reasonable visitation before 8 p.m. 
8. Other times as agreed by the parties. 
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IN THE SECOND JUOICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STANDARD MEDICAL PROVISIONS 
[Plaintiff] [Defendant] [is] [are] ordered to provide health, accident and dental insurance for 
the benefit of the parties' minor children, with deductible amounts and coverage equal to those in 
existence as of the date of this order for so long as coverage is available through insured's current 
or subsequent place of employment (Plaintiff's - Defendant's) is to be primary insurance. Each parent 
is ordered to pay for one-half of any deductible or non covered amounts for such essential medical or 
dental services or prescriptions related thereto that are not paid by the insurance coverage and to 
provide other parent with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to insure the prompt 
payment of the insured portion of such claims and notify other party of insurance claims as paid. The 
custodial parent is to pay routine office calls. 
Neither parent shall contract for or incur any obligation for orthodontia work or elective 
surgery for the child, or any type of psychological counseling or evaluation for a child, anticipating 
co-payment from other parent without the prior agreement or consent of that parent in writing. The 
non-custodial parent will have the right in advance to have a say in the selection of doctors and 
procedures for any ana all orthodontia, or surgery procedures, or pschologicat counseling, for which he 
or she is expected to contribute. If such debts are incurred without said consultation, and written 
consent, then the obligating parent shall have the primae facie obligation to pay any non insurance 
covered expense. 
If an agreement cannot be reached, then before any (other than emergency), medical, orthodontic 
or pschological counseling be done as a co-obligation, the matter shall be brought back before the 
court. The party found to be unreasonably causing the hearing shall pay costs and attorney fees. 
For procedures not covered by the insurance but reasonably within the parties ability to pay 
and necessary to the welfare of the child, such as orthodontia cosmetic surgery, or mental medical then 
each party will normally be ordered to oay one-half of the costs associated with such treatments or 
procedures. 
when the other parent is exDectea to be responsible for deductible amounts attributable to 
medical or dental exoenses incurred for the parties' children, then the incurring parent must provide 
copies of all receipts associated with those expenses within 30 days of the receipt of any billing 
there-tore incurred. Any claims not maae to the other parent within that time frame in writing will be 
primae facie deemed waived. The other party is ordered to make their portion of those payments, or 
rnaxe arrangements to oo so within <*5 days of receipt of the documentation supporting required 
parti cioat1 on. 
The party who nas the health ana accident insurance is ordered to maintain it for the benefit 
of the family until sucn time as the Decree in this matter is final and to make continued coverage 
available to the soouse under "COBRA"; provided however the spouse taking advantage of said coverage 
shall pay the cost thereof unless otherwise ordered by the Court. • 
' / / ! • ' 
Commissioner, Weber) 
County District Court 
(When applicable the standard should be typed into your findings and decree or a typed 
insertion of it shall be attached to the order or decree; not merely referenced) 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS 
RTCKY D. K R A M B U L E 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS! 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY 
Civil No. 910750473 
1. Enter the combined number of natural and adopted children of this mother 
and father. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. 
Refer to Instructions for definition of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid 
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case). * 
2 c Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations 
ordered for the children in this case). 
2d Optional: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in Present Home 
Worksheet for either parent, 
Subtract Line 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted Monthly 
Gross for child support purposes. 
Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of children in Line 
1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED 
adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of 
the Base Support Obligation. 
Enter the children's portion of monthly medical and dental insurance 
preminms paid to insurance company. 
8, Enter the monthly work or training related child cart expense for the 
the children in Line 1. 
9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor parent. 326 
10. Adjusted Base Child Support Award 
Subtract the Obligor's Line 7 from Line 9. 
w 
11. Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child 
Divide Line 10 by Line I. 
32£L 
326 
11 CHILD CARE AWARD 
Muiuply Line 8 by JO to obtain obligors share of child care expense. Add to Line 10 only 
when expense is actually incurred. 
y^\ 
